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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this deliverable is to provide a taxonomy of organisational failures, so 
that there is a basis for analysing some of the possible organisational failure modes 
resulting from putting together two or more organisational systems, each with its own 
purpose in its own organisational context, to make a new DSoS. It thus provides a way of 
examining new emergent failure modes. It also points out possible failure modes that, 
because they are organisational, cannot be prevented (or tolerated) at the level of the 
individual technical systems or the technical system that brings them together. 
In outline, the approach will be to take two simple conceptual models of an 
organisation, models that are relevant to the idea that a system plays a role in an 
organisational context, and use these models to describe a number of organisational 
failure in which a single system can be implicated. By organisational failure here, we 
mean to exclude technical failures of the technical system itself, i.e. failures to deliver –
for whatever reason–  the specified service, but to include those many cases where 
although the service delivered may be considered in accordance with some specification, 
it fails to fulfil some organisational purpose it was intended to fulfill. We shall extend this 
discussion to look at problems emergent from a composition of two organisations.  
The purpose of these models is not to express anything formal, in the way that a proof 
of a result expressed in a process algebra would. Their purpose is to facilitate the creation 
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of new knowledge in the context of a particular situation of organizational failure, so that 
sense can be made of the situation by those in the organisations that are implicated in the 
situation and the designers of systems to support those organisations. That is why the 
question of whether or not the expressive language of the models has a formal semantics 
is irrelevant. There is a difference between a semiotic account of interpretation (what do 
these signs signify to those who come across them as a found object?) and a hermeneutic 
model of interpretation (what did this artifact mean to those present in the moment of its 
creation?) These models of organisational structure and process are deliberately 
simplified so that they can be used in constructing a story that is intended to be 
interpreted hermeneutically. They are not primarily intended for use in a context where 
interpretation is semiotic, and in this they differ from the other , more formal, models in 
DSoS. 
So these models are to be used in the telling of stories about organisational failure. 
The stories told, like all stories, assume a certain conceptual framework in terms of which 
the story is interpreted and which makes sense to all those who hear it. The season why 
this is important for DSoS is that organisational failure is not the sort of thing whose 
possibilities can be exhaustively enumerated in advance by some well-defined method 
(such as HAZOPS for certain kinds of technical system). Rather, the task of the designer 
is to listen to, or to invent, post hoc stories of organisational failure and to consider what 
response to those stories, in terms of what form of prevention, or tolerance, or 
compensation, can be incorporated in the design of a DSoS to support an organization 
whose components are (systems owned by) individual organisations each of which is 
potentially subject to organisational failure. 
The relationship between models of organisation as used in narrative about 
organisational failure, and the failure management language and apparatus used in 
software engineering, is not straightforward. This lack of simple direct relationship is due 
to the differences in kind between technical and social systems. Technical systems are 
designed, controlled from outwith the system, and exhibit law-like regularities. Social 
systems are products of social learning, controlled from within the system and any 
regularities they exhibit are not really law-like.  
So the language in which one talks about the management of failure is very different 
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in the two cases. Indeed, one of the most important distinctions is in the connotations of 
the word “failure” itself. In technical systems, failure is often taken as 'failure to deliver a 
specified service' and is therefore treated as if it were a property of the system, whereas in 
organisations, failure is often a judgement about the organisation. It is true that failure of 
a technical system is indeed also a judgement, but this is often implicit, sometimes so 
much so as to be invisible; whereas organisational failure is always a judgement and 
therefore implies the explicit identification of a judge. In this deliverable, the judge is 
taken to be the designer or configurer of the DSoS, though of course we recognise the 
equal validity of other possible judges who may arrive at a different judgement. And 
when talking about organisational failure, it is the specification which is implicit, 
sometimes so much so as to be invisible. 
Although the concepts of fault, error, failure considered as causal concepts are often 
as applicable to social systems as to technical ones, structural concepts such as boundary, 
interface, exception, signalling, state and so on, all of which are clearly defined concepts 
in a software system, do not have such clear definitions in a social system. To elaborate: a 
boundary is defined by reference to a space within which it is a boundary, but a 
multifaceted social system has many spaces in which boundaries can be drawn and it is  
often unclear which is the best space (or spaces) to choose as elements in a particular 
story, let alone where to draw the boundaries in each space. Interfaces do not really exist 
between social systems, their places being taken, at least in some cases, by boundary 
objects which are interpreted differently on each side of the boundary; but these boundary 
objects may share but few characteristics with the software concept of an object. 
Exceptions and signalling can occur in some social systems, but more often they are 
unplanned and implicit rather than planned and explicit as they are in technical systems. 
This is because in the lack of design and external control, it is often unclear to whom an 
exception should be signalled and what constitutes a signal and in any case there is often 
a failure correctly to interpret the signal ("Not waving but drowning"). Finally, state is a 
very problematic concept when applied to social systems, except in a very loose and 
metaphorical manner of speaking.  
What this means is that the kind of thinking we have to employ in thinking about 
organisational failure is very different from the kind of thinking we employ in the 
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presence of failure in a technical system. Only by making extreme simplifications of the 
concepts of organisational structure and process is it possible to bring discussions of 
organisational and technical failures into a common discourse. In many cases this will 
turn out to be an over-simplification, and perhaps only in very simple organizational 
relationships such as retail or simple brokerage they are good enough. Since this a fairly 
new and unexplored area we are using the Travel Agent case study [DMS3] to bring a 
technical and organizational discussion under the same domain, but we will explore the 
point further by discussing our second case study. During the later stages of the project 
we looked into the European Electric system (EXaMINE), and we will discuss some of 
the organizational failures we found in such a system and the impact they may have. 
Since the second case study has not been discussed before, we introduce it in section 8 
prior to applying the concepts presented in this deliverable. 
It follows from the distinction made earlier between semiotic and hermeneutic 
interpretation that the form of this deliverable is different from some other DSoS 
deliverables. A technical paper with technical apparatus such as formal notations with a 
formal semantics, learned references to current literature, and an epistemic view of 
knowledge as abstraction and interpretation as semiotic, is not appropriate. This 
deliverable is itself more of a story, with a structure which is appropriate to the structure 
of a story, which presents a set of concepts from which other stories -stories of 
organisational failure- can be constructed. Its epistemic view is that knowledge is 
mediation, and in the context of DSoS in particular, that knowledge of organizational 
failure is mediated between the narrator of organisational failure and the designer of a 
DSoS using a conceptual framework understood by both. It is an illustrated story, with 
illustrations not only in the form of pictures but in the form of scenarios that could occur 
in the context of our travel agent and the European electric system case studies, though 
the models can be, and indeed in the past have been, used to account for failures in forms 
of organisation other than a commercial brokerage enterprise. 
2. Design by configuration 
The theory of design that underlies DSoS is design by configuration - i.e. the process 
of designing a system to achieve a certain human purpose is by configuring a set of 
already existing component systems over which the designer has little or no 
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control, and which together might achieve a sufficiently close approximation to that 
purpose in order to deliver a controlled result (of any kind, including abortion) in the 
presence of arbitrary failure including organisational failure. Where the designer has little 
or no control over, or indeed knowledge of, the component or the organisation which is 
its context, the law of requisite variety [RA1964] suggests that a simplified view has to 
be taken both of the services(s) offered by the component and the structure and processes 
of the organisation, and of the management of their various distinct modes of failure. This 
is equally true of organisational and technical components and failure modes. In this 
deliverable, we shall look in particular at failures that can be judged to be failures in 
configuration. This involves looking at the relationships between organisations, and thus 
concentrates less on failures of intra-organisational configuration (though these can form 
a starting point) than failures on inter-organisational configuration. One of the conditions 
of possibility of design by configuration is compositionality - that things can be put 
together (in some space) in a way that does not perturb or compromise the integrity of 
each. Indeed, this is the basis of DSoS and its insistence on simple interfaces in the 
technical domain. However, there is no reason to suppose that organisations -as 
organisations, not as the services they deliver- can be composed in this way. In particular, 
a simplistic view of service delivery and its failure will not do in the presence of 
organisational failure, because the failure to deliver a requested resource because the 
organisation has none left to provide has to be handled very differently from there being 
no organisation left to provide the requested resource. Indeed, the decisions in the two 
cases as to where to place what kind of signalling mechanism and to whom the situation 
is signalled have probably to be taken at different points in the design process. Another 
case of having to know more about a configured infrastructure than is visible at a simple 
interface is when the organisations have combined structurally in some way. For 
example, when two airline companies share the same route it can be important to know 
whether they operate a common tariff and joint recognition of each other's tickets (which 
would imply some co-ordination at the management level of the organisation) or not. 
Again, this becomes an issue in the presence of failure, for example if a traveller had 
planned to catch a plane operated by one company which is cancelled, thereby forcing a 
wait for the next plane, which turns out to be operated by the other company. The reason 
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for taking a simple approach to organisational failure is so as to delineate clearly what 
sorts of failure can, and what sorts cannot, be allowed for in the design of a DSoS 
configuration. For example, a change in market positioning on the part of a supplier 
which does not result in a renegotiation with its customers at the management level of the 
relationship is likely to lead to inter-organisational failure and misunderstanding which 
cannot be adapted to by changes in technical interfaces. More generally, the approach 
adopted in DSoS is to explore whether and to what extent the desired effect of 
configuration by design is achievable through the combination of very simplified models 
of technical linkage matched by equally simplified models of business linkage. It is in the 
nature of business relationships that the concept of a simple interface only facilitates very 
simple relationships, such as that of a drive-through hamburger outlet. Whenever the 
relationship is more complex, it is negotiated, and like all human negotiations, what is 
negotiated is the limits of what may be requested and the limits of what may be offered. It 
is one of the advantages of the travel agent case study that a DSoS approach is neither so 
simple that it is prima facie possible (like the combination of two very simple drive-
through hamburger organisations) nor so complex that it is equally obviously not possible 
(like the combination of two hospitals into a single new organisation). We feel that our 
case study lies neatly between the boundaries between what is possible and what is not, 
so that it is a research issue which we are investigating whether the simplified business 
models presented in the next section are adequate for the sense-making that must 
necessarily precede an account of management of organizational failure in configured 
systems that span multiple domains of management. 
In the case of our second case study, which deals with a much larger and more 
complex system of systems, the concepts of organization and boundary have to be 
extended to map onto nations and national boundaries. The underlying theme and 
common conclusion in both case studies is that since computer systems reflect 
organizational thinking in terms of goals, strategies, they can bring computer systems 
under a SoS in conflict; and this is where what we call organizational failures arise. 
3. Two simple models 
In the following paragraphs we present two simple models to develop our concepts 
using examples from the travel agent case study. In section 8 we apply these 
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concepts to a real system namely the EXaMINE case study. The two simple models we 
present show two different but related aspects of an organisation: structure and process. 
There are many dozens, perhaps hundreds, of models of organisations in the literature of 
organisation theory, but the models we present here are simplified abstractions common 
to most of them in one form or another. Briefly, the structure model is a standard one of 
dividing the organisation into responsibilities for direction, for management and for 
execution. The actual structure of any particular organisation is determined –to a greater 
or lesser degree–  by how these responsibilities are mapped onto individual role holders 
and individuals in the organisation; this can obviously vary from one organisation to 
another. What is invariant across organisations is the existence of these three types of 
responsibility, and the fact that they are mapped onto roles and individuals. 
The process model divides organisational processes into three types: scoping the 
business (i.e. deciding what the organisation is about), resourcing the business (i.e. 
procuring and managing the resources needed for the organisation to do whatever the 
scoping process determines it should do) and delivering the business (i.e. the actual 
performance). 
It is important to realise that this process model is not just a re-articulation of the 
structure model. An organisation that simply combined direction with scoping, 
management with resourcing and execution with delivery would be very naive and not 
very effective. At the very least, each of the scoping, resourcing and delivery processes 
would have its own internal D/M/E structure within it, but the actual relationships in 
practice show a wide variety of configuration possibilities. 
3.1   Organisational structure 
As indicated earlier, we classify the responsibilities that exist in an organisation into 
direction, management and execution responsibilities. 
Direction responsibilities are for deciding on desired future states of the organisation, 
for enunciating strategies for achieving those states, and for allocating generic resources 
(e.g. overall budgets) to enable the achievement. 
Management responsibilities are for turning policy objectives and strategies into 
plans, for transformation of the generic budget into actual resource instances and 
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allocating and deploying them. And of course there are required back channels of reports 
and accounts. 
Similarly execution consumes the resources in fulfilling (or not) the plans and 
reporting back. 
So we have the following simple model: 
 
Figure 1 
It is important to realise that these structural components can be seen as distinct 
collections of responsibilities for dealing with distinct units of failure. It enables the 
distinction to be made between having the wrong policy, having the right policy but an 
inappropriate set of plans, and having the right plans but failure to execute them 
correctly. It also allows for explanations of failure couched in terms of inadequate 
budget, inappropriate allocations, or inadequate or incorrect reports and accounts. How 
these responsibilities map into roles and actors in the organisation is a matter of 
configuration - and configurations can be faulty too. 
We can hide the information channels to produce the following simplification: 
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Direction
Management
Execution
 
Figure 2 
When we compose two organisational structures, there are two levels at which 
composition can take place: 
shared management 
Direction
Management
Execution
Direction
 
Figure 3 
shared execution 
Direction
Management
Execution
Direction
Management
 
Figure 4 
One example of the first is the way Sir Peter de la Billière as commander of the 
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British troops was able, during the Gulf War, to insert himself in to the overall 
operational command team led by the American commander. Although he reported to the 
British Prime Minister rather than to the American President, the British troops saw the 
same single command structure to whom they were responsible as did the American 
troops. An example of the second is when an aero engine manufacturer subcontracts out 
the development of its avionics software to a specialist firm, yet insists on having some of 
its own staff on the development team in order to protect its interests in the 
confidentiality of the control laws being implemented, which it regards as intellectual 
property too valuable to leave in the hands of subcontractors. 
We can now start enumerating different failure modes. In the shared execution case, 
different plans can conflict or interfere, different reports and accounts can be passed 
upwards on the two different channels, execution failure can result in different recovery 
actions at the management level, management can disagree on the allocation of 
responsibilities, and so on. 
Similarly, in the case of shared management, there are opportunities for conflicting 
policies, differing reports and accounts, arguments over managerial responsibilities and 
so on. 
The point of these pictures is to provide a simple pictorial representation so that when 
a particular failure is analysed, it is clear at what level in the organization exception 
signaling and recovery mechanisms can be placed. 
3.2 Organisational process 
We now turn to an equally simple process model. As indicated earlier, this is a model 
of the kinds of process that take place in an organisation. 
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market
scoping
resourcing delivery
suppliers customers
 
Figure 5 
As indicated above, scoping processes are market-facing, dealing with questions such 
as deciding on position within the market –and indeed which market– monitoring the 
movement of the market and deciding on appropriate responses, and –for some kinds of 
business– actually making the market. 
Resourcing processes are supplier-facing. They are concerned with acquiring 
sufficient resources (including of course human resources) to run the business, 
maintaining those resources, monitoring their quality, managing suppliers and so on. 
Delivery processes are customer-facing. They are concerned with obtaining and 
fulfilling orders, enlarging the customer base, obtaining feedback as a useful form of 
input to the scoping processes and evaluating the resourcing processes. 
Again, it is easy to see a number of possible failure modes immediately. Inappropriate 
market positioning, inadequate resourcing and delivery processes, failures in 
communication both within and between these processes. From the point of view of 
DSoS, though, it is again the case that we are interested in the additional failures that can 
occur when organisations are composed. 
One very common way in which these processes are composed is in a supply chain or 
network, in which the unit of composition is by linking the resourcing and delivery 
processes: 
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scoping
resourcing delivery
scoping
resourcing delivery
 
Figure 6 
Or with multiple suppliers and customers 
scoping
resourcing delivery
scoping
resourcing delivery
scoping
resourcing delivery
scoping
resourcing delivery
scoping
resourcing delivery
 
Figure 7 
We can now see additional failure modes concerned with mismatch of various kinds 
between organisations represented by the double links. In the simple case of a chain 
which is concerned with extracting value from a market,  
scoping
resourcing delivery
scoping
resourcing delivery
scoping
resourcing delivery
?
 
Figure 8 
there needs to be some agreement on the apportionment of value, and this can only occur 
Dependable Systems of Systems  PCE4: Models of Organisational Failure 
 
16 
within the scoping processes. It is no good if the prices charged at the bottom end of the 
value chain mean that the prices at the top end are so high that the market is no longer 
viable.  
There is also the possibility of mismatch between the scoping decisions. For example, 
a travel agent will normally try to match the market position of the hotel with the market 
position of the airline, preferring to fly travellers to cheap hotels using no-frills carriers, 
or to expensive hotels using full-service carriers, and indeed may choose to specialise in 
one end of the market or the other. Another example is an aero-engine manufacturer who 
changes their scope from being a vendor of engine units to being a provider of thrust-
hours. This might, or might not, prove to be a source of organisational failure. However, 
such a decision would have an impact on the management and execution structures. It 
would also have an impact on the relationship with the company's customers, which 
would change from being a product and maintenance relationship to a service 
relationship. One form of organisational failure would be a failure to renegotiate this 
relationship. 
4. So what can go wrong? 
Although the scoping/resourcing/delivery model describes an organisation in terms of 
processes, these processes do not always (or indeed hardly ever) employ distinct 
mechanisms. Thus the delivery mechanism will embody aspects of the (results of the) 
scoping process; and so on all the way round. And, as explained previously, in an 
effective value-adding network, the scoping policies of individual enterprises may not be 
independent. This means that we cannot assume that we can provide a failure1-proof 
travel agent simply by connecting together delivery mechanisms from component 
suppliers. Examples of scoping mismatch include marketing policies (e.g. different 
booking systems can assume it is the customer, or an agent, who is interacting with the 
system), systems with differing models of trust (e.g. credit card authentication required 
before the transaction can begin, as opposed to authentication when the transaction is 
committed), and so on. These policy mismatches should not be seen as mere technical 
                                                  
1
 where failure, here as always in this deliverable, is a failure to deliver a desired service to the customer, not just 
failures of a technical mechanism 
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glitches to be overcome by ingenious Java programming in the travel agent system. 
Rather, they are policy mismatches which constitute a fault which may result in a failure 
of the travel agent to deliver an adequate service to the customer, and recovery 
management needs to be addressed at that level. In the EXaMINE case study where 
component systems are behind national boundaries these policy mismatches can take the 
form of political debates to be resolved via diplomatic channels and appropriate 
regulatory bodies before the SoS is formally specified. We discuss these issues in section 
8. 
Two particular sources of problem arise from (a) post-transaction failures and (b) 
post-transaction changes. 
If one component organisation or service in a brokered package of services fails, then 
under some but not all circumstances it is the responsibility of the service provider to 
make alternative arrangements, or compensate, for the loss. Where there is a lack of 
transparency, which is particularly true of the travel industry, it is understandable that a 
travel agent may not wish to make it clear to the customer in advance what the possible 
failures are and how they might be recovered from. In the event of airline failure 
(whether lack of aircraft or cessation of trading), for example, some –but not all– airlines 
will themselves try to rebook passengers on other flights. Some –but not all– hotels will 
seek to re-accommodate travellers if booked accommodation is not available. Some –but 
not all– travel agents have an emergency number which clients can phone for assistance 
in the preceding cases. And so on. 
There are three major strategies which can be used to deal with these post-transaction 
organisational failures. They are 
Forward recovery 
Alleviation 
Compensation 
Fault-tolerance (“We have booked you onto BA and KLM and United Airlines so 
that even if two of them fail, you can still get to New York”) does not seem to be an 
option. 
An example of forward recovery is rebooking, either by the failed airline or the travel 
agent, onto an alternative carrier. An example of compensation is leaving the 
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responsibility for alternative arrangements up to the traveller who can then claim on some 
insurance policy — either traveller’s or the travel agent’s. An example of alleviation is 
the facility offered by some charge cards that under circumstances of failure, a certain 
amount may be charged to the card which will not be recharged to the cardholder (usually 
provided the original charge was made on the card). 
We can draw a simple model to show how these strategies relate to the simple S/R/D 
process model: 
S
R D
airline
S
R D
S
R D
travel agent
hotel
customer
S
R D
airline
S
R D
hotel
customer
post-transaction delivery
rendezvous and transaction
 
Figure 9 
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Figure 10 
As indicated in the diagrams above, post-transaction recovery needs to be co-
ordinated through the existence of some communication channel between the scoping 
processes of the individual organisations. This can be relatively informal, or it may 
involve an additional organisation such as a trade association of some kind (such as 
IATA or ABTA). Such organisations will have their own system and access mechanisms 
(which may or may not be accessible to the traveller and may or may not be online to the 
travel agent). There is also a degree of freedom concerning the level in the accessing 
organisation at which the access is permitted, which may be at the execution level or the 
management level. 
We have here an example of a commonly observed phenomenon to which perhaps 
not enough attention is paid, which is that in the presence of  failure it is often necessary 
to expand the boundaries of what is considered to be the system. In the case of a DSoS, 
this boundary expansion can occur with respect to any of the component systems, and it 
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can also occur by having to consider some new system as part of the DSoS whose 
function will only be invoked in failure recovery. Identifying the need for, and 
appropriate use of, such systems requires a systematic approach to the analysis of a DSoS 
with respect to organisational failure through the construction of appropriate stories. So a 
design proposal for a design as configuration process is to think through the possible 
organisational failure modes and decide what level of recovery (including none, of 
course) is feasible. 
5. Post-transaction Communication Management 
To do business with an organisation requires knowledge of three things: how to 
communicate with the organisation, how to transact with the organisation and how to 
recover if the organisation fails. For example, if an organisation receives a message but 
due to internal communication problem is unable to deliver it to the correct place, it is 
usually not effective simply to resend the message; an alternative route must be found, 
knowledge of the management structures sometimes being of assistance here, or perhaps 
an alternative sender must be found such as a lawyer of prominent consumer journalist. 
Transaction is more complex than communication, and it is important to discuss post-
transaction management since it has many implications both at the policy level and the 
delivery system. Some of the questions we can raise to illustrate this point are Who is 
responsible for informing the client about changes of the trip's details? and Who handles 
customer complaints? 
We start discussing problems of communication by asking the following question: 
Can the component systems (autonomous systems) contact the TA to inform it of changes 
in policies, service etc? 
We have taken the view that autonomous systems expose a call interface via which 
we send requests regarding their services. The implication of maintaining the ability to 
initiate and terminate a conversation rules out the possibility of a component system 
informing the TA about changes in its structure, policies, operation etc. This has a major 
implication on the organisation of the TA and poses a major challenge. Alterations in the 
operation, policies and scope of the component system need to be detected by the TA 
itself. The immediate question is whether we can we successfully detect these via the call 
interface only. As we have so far made clear changes in policies, customer base 
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and operations cannot be viewed by the call interface. The protocol may remain as it is 
even if the customer base changes. 
More generally, the travel agent case study presented here is concerned with 
multiparty transactions which are distributed over many locations and which may require 
a considerable time to complete. Each party in such a transaction has a set of 
preconditions and a set of post-conditions which must be met before the transaction is 
judged to have been successful from that party's point of view. Thus, for a transaction to 
be judged to be well formed, the evidence, embodied in a set of instruments, must 
reliably reflect the intended acts of remote parties. For this to be the case, there are three 
characteristics of the instruments and the operations on them which must be assumed: 
 Atomicity: specific actions occur exactly once or not at all and the parties are able 
to confirm completion of an action. 
 Persistence: once information is generated it does not disappear; it may be 
changed, but the instrument(s) must record the original and the changed information. 
 Security: which, in this case, refers to the authenticity and integrity of information 
represented in instruments. 
There are two configurations of the relationships of a multi-party transaction at the 
structural level: 
• A centralised transaction monitor in which each of the participants has a direct 
relationship with one particular participant in the role of transaction manager. The logical 
point of co-ordination is also a physical point of control. 
• Distributed transaction management, in which each participant undertakes 
transaction management responsibilities and the logical point of co-ordination is, in fact, 
replicated and distributed. 
In the first approach, which is implemented by transaction monitoring functionality, 
all transacting parties must have a pre-defined relationship with one particular party 
responsible for the co-ordination. "Pre-defined" here means that these relationships were 
established outside the context and infrastructure in which the transactions will be 
executed. In the second, which is implemented in distributed transaction management, 
each party depends on all the others and must be able to monitor and interpret their acts. 
These two approaches to the allocation of responsibilities in a distributed transaction 
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result in a different relationship between structural and infrastructural responsibilities. In 
the case of the centralised transaction monitor, the participants depend on the 
nfrastructure only for potentially unreliable message transport services. Atomicity of 
operations, persistence of information and security, authenticity and integrity of messages 
are dependabilities or qualities of service which are delivered at the structural level either 
as end-to-end or centralised mechanisms.  
In the case of a distributed transaction, the economies of provision are quite different. 
Since each participant takes responsibility for components of the transaction and needs to 
be able to monitor remote activities and states, each needs to be able to rely on the quality 
of a set of service and applications components within their own domain and in each of 
those of the other participants. In this case, the pre-established relationship must be with 
the infrastructural suppliers and it is possible that the transacting parties are establishing a 
new context as well as a new instance of commerce. In this case, new instruments, which 
arise from the characteristics of the new context, may well be required.  
In the distributed approach to transaction management, and here we are concerned not 
merely with distribution over time and space but, more significantly, distribution over the 
boundaries of different enterprises, each enterprise must have the option and capability of 
replicating all those aspects of transaction co-ordination which are relevant to their 
particular interests. They must also be able to rely on the provider of the infrastructural 
environment to ensure that their view of the current state of any transaction is coherent 
with the views of all the other participants of that transaction. Thus, atomicity, 
persistence and security become responsibilities of the environment provider and 
infrastructural in nature, and it is these qualities of service and application which dictate 
the characteristics of the instruments of the structural conversations. We hope to show, in 
deliverable DSC3, how these considerations can form the basis of an approach to the 
management of at least some forms of organisational failure. 
6. Application to the Travel Agent case study 
The purpose of this section is to indicate a number of examples of how the simple 
models introduced can be used to think about organisational issues arising in the design 
of a DSoS to support an online travel agent (TA). Previous deliverable CS1 has 
introduced the travel agent case study and explained our approach to this form of 
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brokerage. 
The structure model of the TA reveals its scope, resources and delivery system. The 
TA provides full trips consisting of separately chosen accommodation, flight and vehicle 
to holiday makers. This automatically sets the market which the TA targets. After the 
market has been identified there are certain assumptions and decisions that need to be 
made. Bearing in mind that the scope determines the type of resource, we have selected a 
number of booking systems which are considered appropriate for the TA in the sense that 
their scope is compatible – we are, for example, excluding package holiday providers. 
Within the scope we have defined a number of policies regarding the operation of the 
TA, assumptions about the clientele, the interaction process and the overall responsibility 
held by the TA. The selection of the type of resource is based on the assumption that the 
booking systems comply with the scope we have determined for our system.  
The delivering system provides the service determined by the scope using the 
resources. Again, the type of delivery system is determined more by the scooping 
decisions we have made than by the resources brokered. Design decisions, and 
implementation schemes are based on this. 
The following diagram illustrates what we have discussed so far. 
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the linking interfaces of the delivering systems. The booking systems are assumed to be 
autonomous organisational structures that provide a particular service. We obtain their 
services via a linking interface. The thick black line indicates an organisational boundary 
which prevents us viewing the scope of the participating systems. We only have access to 
the service i.e. the delivery system. 
Observing a system from a call interface only provides a limited view about the 
system’s services and in particular the policies and scope of those services. Given that the 
scope of the TA defines its market target and the interaction with its clients it is wise to 
obtain resources (i.e. booking systems) whose scope complies with the scope of the TA. 
The scope however cannot be seen via the call interface. We could indeed observe and 
test a LIF to improve fault tolerance of the overall system but we cannot obtain 
information about the scope of the service (e.g. who it is intended for). We can obtain 
partial information on how the service is delivered by looking at the protocol and the 
relevant transactions that take place but we could not for example obtain information 
about the policies regarding a protocol, authentication, levels of trust etc. This limitation 
can be accommodated within a static system because decisions can be made prior to 
setting up a TA delivery mechanism. What cannot so easily be done is to detect, and 
respond to, changes in the scoping decisions of suppliers. 
Some typical failures would arise in the following scenarios. We have assumed that 
the TA policy has defined a way which the TA interacts with customers and processes 
their requests. Such policy assumes, for example, that the TA does not require 
registration and shows a high level of trust in its clients. We also assume the TA chooses 
to consider a journey as an end-to-end arrangement. 
a) Booking System A requires customer registration.  
This is in direct conflict with the protocol of the TA since the latter does not require 
registration. Although protocol differences like this can be observed at the LIF, additional 
policies regarding the levels of trust (which the registration process is related to) cannot 
be observed at the LIF. This can be regarded as a mismatch between policies of 
organisational trust. 
b) Company A is a ‘no-frills’ airline (customer base). 
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Such airlines typically take no responsibility for knock-on consequences of delayed 
or cancelled flights, even when the next leg is one of their own operations. This is an 
example of market target clash between the TA and the supplying system. Obviously this 
cannot be observed at the LIF and additional monitoring mechanisms at the level of the 
TA would be needed to resolve these issues. This is in direct contrast with the scope of 
the TA which targets independent holiday makers traveling on full-service airlines. 
There could be many examples like the ones above that illustrate the point that LIFs do 
not offer adequate information for including an autonomous system as a resource of a 
SoS. We count these as examples of organisational failure since recovery, if it is to be 
achieved at all, has to be done at the level of the organisation. 
Let us view another category of failures that is raised during the actual service 
delivery. Remember that we have assumed that systems are autonomous in the sense that 
they operate outside the scope of the SoS. 
c) Inaccuracy of information  
The quality of information produced by the booking system could hinder the overall 
service offered by the TA. Questions such as ‘is the information up-to-date’ and ‘is the 
source reliable’ cannot be answered by only looking at the LIF. The main question that 
we need to consider when we compose a service from various sources is whether the 
quality of data adheres to the quality expected by the TA and its customer base. It is a sad 
fact that some operators publish incorrect information about their services on their own 
websites. Here again it is a policy decision to be made by the TA how much effort they 
are prepared to spend in dealing with recovery from failures experienced by their clients 
due to misinformation outside the control of the TA. 
d) Service offered differs from the service promised or advertised 
This is closely related to the first point and again unless performance records are 
maintained this type of information cannot be found at the level of the LIF. However, this 
raises the possible need for an additional interface to the TA which allows clients to 
submit reports to the TA on the services brokered by the TA. This is a facility already 
offered by conventional travel agents, particularly those serving the business travel 
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community. 
e) Time semantics  
It would be wrong to assume that component system operate on the same time 
semantics regarding the handling of requests. In fact it is likely that component system 
will operate according to their own semantics which are embedded into the delivery 
system and hidden from view.  The TA needs to be aware of these prior to making any 
requests. Consider the following example. The TA has a 30 second timeout rule. This 
implies that a reply for any request has to be received within 30 seconds. If this does not 
happen the TA throws a timeout. The booking system however operates a queue which 
due to its nature and the number of requests received operates a 45 second timeout rule. 
This as one can imagine can lead to the booking system actually making a booking i.e. 
handling the request successfully while the TA thinks otherwise. Can we observe time 
semantics over the call interface?. Unfortunately these are set as part of the operation 
policies of each system and are hidden from view.  
We have shown so far that call interfaces (LIFs) can only offer some indication regarding 
the services of the booking system. In fact we have shown that although they can show 
how a service is delivered (protocol) they do not indicate the operation policies of the 
service. Additional interfaces are necessary to do this. 
Composing an emerging service out of services obtained from autonomous systems 
can lead to failure due to a number of errors. We summarise these below. 
a) Market  
The service may not be intended for the same market base. These targets are set as 
part of the scope of the organization and are therefore invisible at the interface level. 
b) Protocol  
Although the protocol is visible and to an extent it can be manipulated, we cannot 
always assume that we can compose the trip using any component system. Although 
wrapping would allow us to hide some of the incompatibilities regarding for example 
requirements expressed as additional requests, they cannot hide certain aspects of the 
interface that are part of a wider policy e.g. authentication, user registration etc. 
c) Reliability of Service 
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As we have mentioned earlier this cannot be assumed and additional mechanisms 
would have to be in place to ensure that the same quality as described by the scope of the 
TA would be maintained throughout. 
d) Responsibilities 
There are a number of responsibilities that need to be assigned to certain roles in 
order to avoid failure. Consider the following questions: Who is responsible for 
informing the user of changes? Who is responsible for compensating the user? Can the 
user cancel the trip and within what time scale?  All these responsibilities need to be 
assigned roles in order to avoid failure.  
7. Recovery Strategies  
Some of the organizational failures can be prevented by adding additional layers of 
exception handling, maintaining additional information about each component system, 
and keeping track of performance records. Some of the following could solve some of the 
errors that give rise to failures. 
a) Accessing additional interfaces. 
Although this may not always be possible it is desirable to obtain some information 
(such as public information) about the scope and policies of the systems. An interface 
between the scopes of the two systems would eliminate failure raised from clashing 
policies. It would also provide a better idea as to whether it is feasible to include a 
particular system as a resource. However, to be effective, this would require support at 
the management level of the separate organisations. 
b) Metadata 
Metadata information could be used to maintain certain policies in data structures. 
While not all policies can be represented in data structures, keeping metadata about 
customer base, protocols and authentication would allow the TA to reason about the 
composition of the emerging service (e.g. why provision of the emerging service by 
components a, d and f is better than a, b and c). Since operation policies can change, 
metadata would also need to be changed. Additionally we would need to ensure a reliable 
interface for obtaining such information. 
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c) Model of Responsibilities 
While maintaining the brokerage model of operation, providing the user of a model of 
responsibilities (e.g. who is responsible for what) would help the TA to assign roles for 
every responsibility (cancellation policy or changes in trip details). As we mentioned 
earlier post transaction management needs to be dealt with at the level of the SoS and all 
responsibilities derived by it need to be assigned roles. 
d) Composing according to user requirements 
Being able to compose an emerging service according to user requirements would 
allow the TA to avoid failures regarding clashes between certain policies (the user is a 
backpacker while the trip is for business class travelers). This of course implies certain 
technical implementation in order to obtain data about the type of client and address that 
particular client using the appropriate service. 
e) Maintaining performance records 
Maintaining records on different compositions and users would help the TA to assess 
the compatibilities between the services offered by its component systems and the type of 
users it services. It would also allow the TA to evolve its services according to the 
evolution of the component system. Additionally they could provide an indication about 
changing policies, scope, operations etc. 
f) Involving the user 
Finally involving the user in certain decisions would allow the TA to drop certain 
responsibilities. The user can be involved in selecting a particular configuration of a 
particular trip that addresses his type. The TA could additionally make suggestions about 
certain configurations and maintain track of users’ preferences. This would help resolve a 
number of issues regarding targeting the right customer with the right service. Involving 
the user in this process would help the TA to resolve issues raised by quality of service 
(user can select a service based on past experience), reliability, accuracy etc.  
Having discussed the domain of organizational failure using examples from the 
Travel Agent case study let us discuss these issues from a different angle. In the next 
section we are taking a look at a case study where the types of failures we have discussed 
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so far have to realized and resolved prior to requirements engineering. We will see how 
social, economic and political factors play an important role in the delivery of a service 
whose components reside behind national boundaries. As we mentioned earlier although 
we received the case study at the later stages of our project it serves as a good way to 
ground our concepts. 
8. Application to the EXaMINE case study 
During the later stages of the project we identified a case study which we think can 
help us expose a number of our concerns in a real life scenario. We have on many 
occasions in this document used the travel agent case study as an example. The 
EXaMINE case study is a study of the vulnerabilities of the European Electric System 
(EPS) mainly in physical technical terms (both internal and external). We have however 
identified a number of possible and real scenarios that need to taken into consideration in 
order to assess the feasibility of such a Pan-European network of power distribution. In 
the document so far we have talked about organisational structure and process and how 
faults in these can eventually lead to what we call organisational failures. Given the 
current case study which deals with a number of interconnected grids operating under 
national law, we would like to abstract and show how political, social and economic 
factors embedded inevitably into such a system can lead to “failures”. Notice that we are 
not abstracting from the previous chapters but rather expanding the notion of 
organisational boundaries to national boundaries where laws, regulations and governing 
bodies affect the way a system is architected and consequently managed. 
8.1 Introduction to the case study 
The European electric power system (EPS) is composed of a set of national grids each 
of which is in turn itself a complex network, including a large number of components and 
devices. The behavior of the EPS is controlled by a layered structure designed to cope 
with national grids usually encompassing a few regional control centers and one national 
[EX2002a]. Contractual arrangements determine the degree of power interchange that 
can take place. The organization here (equivalent to the component system of a SoS) is 
the national electric power system which operates behind national boundaries and under 
government regulation. 
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The EXaMINE case study is studying the feasibility of the development of an EU 
wide network to support power distribution. It is particularly interested in the 
dependability aspects of the network mainly from a technical perspective. We are using 
the case study mainly to show that there are a number of additional issues namely 
political, economic and social factors that can determine the architecture, design and 
implementation of such a network.  
The aim of the EXaMINE case study is to assess and identify an optimum security 
model for the EU wide electric power system. We are merely concerned with the 
organizational failures that could occur in terms of political, economic and social impact. 
The basic idea behind the case study is that the various national networks could work 
together to form a network of networks. This is not much different from a system of 
systems. Likewise a SoS where part of the emphasis is on crossing organizational 
boundaries (implying dealing with diverse political issues, cultures, goals etc), a network 
of networks for power supply within the EU is an abstraction of a SoS, in the sense that it 
crosses national borders, laws, governing bodies etc. For consistency purposes we are 
referring to the EPS as a SoS. 
8.2 EXaMINE and Dependability 
In the beginning of this deliverable we stated that although in technical terms failure 
is the deviation of the behavior of the system from what was intended, an organizational 
failure is a judgment for the organization. In this section along with our original goal we 
will use some of the dependability terminology to assess how it applies. We know 
[JCLDep] that dependability is the property of a computer system such that reliance can 
justifiably be placed on the service it delivers. Applying this to an Electric Power system 
we could infer that dependability of such a system refers to its ability to provide a 
continuous service its users. Security in this sense is also related and affected by the 
reliability of the system which is the property of the system that ensures continuous 
service. Of course a system such as an electric power system is permanently exposed to a 
number of internal and external problems, ranging from component faults to terrorist 
attacks. For an electric power system that extends throughout the EU, properties such as 
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readiness which implies availability and continuity of service which implies reliability 
are essential. In the EPS these properties are not only properties of a computer systems 
that delivers this service but also properties of the political and economic network that 
plays a substantial role in its operation. As we shall see the whole issue of dependability 
is also political issue. 
The purpose of the case study is not to address these issues in technical terms but to 
show how organizational failures (sometimes influenced strongly by economics, social 
and political factors) play an important role in the delivery of such a service (through a 
computer system). 
8.3 Organisational Failures of the EPS 
In the travel agent case study we envisaged organisational failures stemming from 
incompatible customer bases, diverse goals within the organisations, lack of 
communication and so on. Within an EPS we can classify these in terms of economic 
factors (e.g. market environment), political factors (e.g. authority, power balance) and 
national factors such as interests and security all of which are intertwined. An additional 
dimension in EXaMINE is that although in the case of the TA we had overall control 
maintained by the SoS itself here control is distributed. In fact as was mentioned earlier 
control is the major cause of “failure” in EXaMINE. Notice that we are moving from 
organisational to national boundaries where competitors in the TA case study can take the 
form of political enemies in EXaMINE.  
From the EXaMINE case study [EX2002b] we learn that economic changes within 
the EU call for a more dynamic market based environment and therefore re-structuring of 
the entire electric sector, following the European Community directive 92 of 1996. The 
result of this directive is open competition and third party access to the transmission 
systems, which in turn increases the volatility on the system as a whole. Competition in 
an open market can create strong demand for interconnection capacity to cope with the 
amount of interchanges across the full interconnected system. Since we have the 
technology to visualize such systems we ask the same question; What can possibly go 
wrong? 
Crossing organizational boundaries implies in many cases crossing cultural 
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differences, laws, goals. A European wide electrical power system is effectively a 
network of interconnected grids. Each grid is operating behind strong national borders 
each of which operates according to its own laws and regulations. At one end of the 
spectrum this may have to do with constitutional obligations regarding the operation of 
the market (In some EU countries power supply is operated under government owned 
monopolies) where changes are decided by the government itself. It is not however only a 
matter of laws and regulations.  
Electric power has strategic importance and as such failures in a national electric 
power system are a matter of national security. 
The regulations regarding security, as well as security prevention are also set and 
dependant upon government regulators. The degree of security applied and the security 
prevention regulations that are in place are based and estimated upon the degree of 
national threat. Since there is such instability in terms of regulators, market policies and 
national laws it is clear that the network of interconnected grids is a network of 
incompatible and independently operated national electric power systems. More 
specifically the incompatibilities relate to national laws which govern the market 
conditions which in turn determine the environment (monopolistic as opposed to open 
market). Regulations are nationally determined without an overall SoS wide policy 
determining the operation of the SoS. So the question that needs to be answered is? Who 
has control of the SoS in the case of EXaMINE? Could an EU wide regulatory body 
prevail and set the standards for operation as well as security and security prevention?  
 
Assume that EU forced participating countries to accelerate the replacement of laws 
and regulations to create an EU wide grid for power distribution that complies with a 
particular structural context. On the other hand EU does not have legal power to enforce a 
common way of organizing the whole business. For reference in EU there are as many 
regulators as there are countries and about as many different regulations as regulators 
[EX20002b] So another failure as such arises from the fact that separate laws govern each 
national power system. It is also a question of authority which we have raised on DSoS in 
the past. Can we provide a SoS dependably where control is distributed? 
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An EU regulatory body which would effectively manage the SoS would have to be 
developed by all participating systems. Unlike the TA case study where the SoS (owner 
of the emerging service) was the regulator in such a system as EPS the authority and 
legitimacy of the body would be questioned.  
 
Let us draw some parallels. 
 
In the TA case study the SoS we can set requirements regarding the types of systems 
to participate. In EPS an EU regulatory body could not possibly set requirements 
regarding political scene (given the diversity between western and eastern Europe) of 
each participating country. So in the first case authority can remain central. In the case of 
EPS this is a reason for dispute and consequent “failure”. So the property of availability 
becomes primarily a political issue. 
 
Consider the point of diversity. On the travel agent case study we used a simple 
algorithm to divert to a similar service when a component system was not functioning. In 
EPS diversity (i.e. the continuity of service property ) becomes a political rather than a 
technical issue. Interchanges of power would have to be carefully thoughtout and 
operated within a legal domain. In fact the “algorithm” that would carry out such a 
process would have to comply with international law. 
 
The SoS TA can make use of new components as long as it adheres to its regulations. 
In EPS new participants would have to have SoS wide agreement. What happens 
however when a participant becomes a political enemy? 
  
Consider the case of national security. Some of the components of such a vast 
network are of strategic importance. Geopolitical position of these components will also 
cause disputes as they raise the issue of “power” distribution of the network.  
 
Information exchange is another important issue is such a vast system. The model of 
networks is essentially formed by a series of national mathematical models. These 
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include all electrical components such as generators, lines and transformers. Some of the 
practical problems to be solved are that the model (as a whole) is too large to compute 
[EX2002b]. If neighbouring networks must be modeled in each country, this will require 
a detailed and updated information of each network and this will inevitably have an 
impact to that country’s own network. A large part of the algorithms that carry out the 
analyses have been patented and are therefore commercially sensitive. The input data is 
obtained via the results of the electric market and according to bilateral contracts among 
agents (generating and consumers). Input is also provided by voltage magnitude in 
different substations, active and reactive power of each station and network topology. 
The information needed as input to the process is located in each national system and 
market operators. The quality of the information can vary, because not all countries have 
the same rgulation in the market resolution or the information is (or became) confidential.  
Given an EU wide system for power distribution one can conclude the need for a vast 
amount of information exchange between the various grids. Some of the information may 
relate to usage on certain times, days etc.  In a number of EU countries (specially where 
EPS is operated under a monopoly) information such as statistics and statistical analyses 
are confidential information. This may not only be a way to hinder possible market 
expansion (or evolution to a more competitive environment) but because of national 
security (terrorism). This also raises the issue of trust within the system. 
 
On the other hand moving to an EU wide competitive market information exchange 
may also be hindered on the grounds of competitive advantage.  
 
At this point one would have to think about diplomatic disputes, national 
disagreements on certain policies, politics and even cases of war. Political pressure will 
tend to reduce freedom to exchange information and generally hinder decision making in 
special cases where issues such as serious disputes or war arise. Again the question of 
power plays an important role. 
 
In terms of security such a vast network would require a number of monitoring tools. 
The tools needed to monitor the security of such as network must be reliable with an 
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increasing need of information. Information however in competitive markets is normally 
economically and commercially sensitive. So open access to information cannot be 
guaranteed. 
8.4 What have we learned? 
Looking into the EXaMINE case study it is evident that a number of factors can play 
an important role in the way a service is delivered. The conclusions we want to draw by 
looking at these two diverse case studies is that since political thinking which implies 
cultural aspects, goals, long term strategies and short term objectives are embedded into a 
computer system then computer systems can be in conflict when delivering a common 
service. New architectures (e.g. dot.NET ) seem to be pushing forward the idea of cross 
language, cross platform connectivity of modular pieces of software that reside behind 
organisational boundaries. Indeed the security issue may not be as strong as in the case of 
EXaMINE, nevertheless as long as software reflects the objectives of its owner or 
regulator  there will be disputes which may lead to failures. Can this be prevented? We 
need to take a new look at the conceptual level, and explore the problem space that is 
created in more detail. We are moving from centralised to distributed control, and as such 
we need to acknowledge the need to recognise systems or components not only as entities 
of a process a function or a service but as responsibility holders with a role to play within 
a domain of distributed process and distributed control. We will look into these issues in 
the final deliverable.    
9. Scoping Organisational Failures 
A major scoping issue for DSoS is the decision between the following choices: 
a) Are we adapting the SoS to the way its participants work  
b) Are we adapting a Participant to the SoS’s scope? 
c) Are we adapting the SoS to its customer base? 
Each question has different implications regarding the architecture of the SoS and the 
type of service is provides. Adapting to a particular participant implies that the TA does 
not need to define a scope as it would act as an extension of an existing service. The 
scope and operation policies would have already been defined and therefore the effort 
should indeed be concentrated on transferring data from the source to the SoS and finally 
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to the customers. 
If we assume that the airline systems are adapting to the scope of the TA then we 
need wrapping mechanisms that will resolve incompatibilities regarding protocol 
differences, and operation policies. 
Adapting to the customer base would require the maintenance of records that capture 
user requirements. Furthermore regular assessment of these would also be necessary in 
order to identify changes in the customer needs. This would also help resolve 
compositional issues when selecting particular services. There are many important 
questions which need to be resolved before we develop a delivery mechanism and we 
start defining the scope of the SoS. Although we want to maintain the brokerage model of 
operation we do not want to completely hide the services out of which we compose the 
emerging service. The implication of this is that we need to develop an intelligent 
brokerage mechanism that will not only pass information obtained by several systems to 
the customer base, but will also advise customers with regards to many issues mentioned 
earlier. 
The TA does not necessarily need to hide completely the component system from the 
user’s view. In fact providing the user with the model of responsibilities (who sells what, 
who handles what) would allow some of the issues raised by the inability of the 
component systems to talk to the TA to be resolved. The TA also needs to maintain an 
exception model from each component system in order to advise the user regarding 
exceptions being thrown or mask these exceptions by taking action (diverse; use other 
component systems) depending on whether a component system is busy or offline.  
Although option ( c ) above would seem in many ways to be the most desirable, we 
have identified a number of additional information structures that are needed to support 
the travel agent one of whose uses is to assist in the recovery from organizational failure. 
Examples of these are to be found in 
the catalogue of offers, which needs to include information concerning aspects of the 
service providers’ policies and market scope, and strategies for dealing with 
exceptions thrown by the service providers’ systems 
the register of bookings, which needs to include an access mechanism to be invoked 
when a supplier changes the terms and conditions or quality of service offered 
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the customer reports, which needs to be consulted when enquiries are made as to the 
suitability of service suppliers 
the (emergency) advisory system, which deals with important notifications affecting 
the holiday and offers assistance in rescheduling and other forward recovery 
procedures. 
The fact that additional data structures are needed to cope with failure is an instance 
of a more general characteristic of organisational failure, which is that recovery from it 
cannot be brought into a framework offered by current approaches to recovery of a 
concurrent and composed technical system, because the relationships between 
organisational scope and policy on the one hand and organisational state, process and 
behaviour (particularly in the presence of failure) on the other, simply cannot be 
expressed in the purely behavioural concepts adopted by such approaches. Although such 
approaches may be systemically desirable, they may not be organisationally feasible 
(because of organisational policy for example). An example of this is a low-cost airline 
which takes no responsibility for assisting passengers who miss a connection due to late 
arrival of the inbound flight, even if they operate both the incoming and outgoing flights. 
Under these circumstances, company policy is that travellers are simply told to make 
their own alternative arrangements, which may involve recourse back to the travel agent 
and/or a travel insurance company who may not have been a party to the original 
transaction.  
The relationships just mentioned need to be maintained by the owner of the DSoS, 
since they are an emergent feature of the composition of systems. We have some ideas of 
what a systematic approach to strategies for managing (i.e. recovery from or  
compensating for) organisational failure in component systems over which the DSoS 
owner has no direct control could involve, and propose to report on this in Deliverable 
DSC3 "Dependability in Multiple Domains of Management" (due at the end of the 
project) 
10. Further Reading 
The following texts have provided ideas for this deliverable, though sometimes the 
connection is pretty indirect: 
Beer, S. Brain of the Firm, Wiley, 1981. 
Dependable Systems of Systems  PCE4: Models of Organisational Failure 
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de la Billiere, P. Looking for Trouble, HarperCollins, 1995.  
 
Star, S.L.. The structure of ill-structured solutions: boundary objects and heterogeneous 
distributed problem solving. In L. Gasser & M. N. Huhns (Eds.), Distributed Artificial 
intelligence. (pp. 37-54), Morgan Kaufman, 1989. 
 
Weick, K.E, Making Sense of the Organization, Blackwell, 2000. 
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